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1. INTRODUCTION
The  Department of Economics of the Catholic University of Chile has a
long tradition of evaluating social projects, in other words, projects involving
investment in human capital. It started) in 1977, with the first evaluation of the
National Complementary Feeding Program (PNAC) and continued with the study
of Full Care Centers for Minors (2-6 years old) in Extreme Poverty ( Centro de
Atención Integral para Menores en Pobreza Extrema, (CAI) and the study of the
Centros de Atención Diurna (CAD), where primary and secondary education
students in poverty would attend during the half day they are not in school, to
name a few of the several social programs evaluated by the Inter American Course
on Project Evaluation (CIAPEP). This effort continued with an analysis of housing
subsidy systems conducted in the late 80s, and it continues now in 2003 with the
evaluation of the labor and economic reconversion program  which was put into
operation when the coal mines were closed in Lota in the late 90s.
2. PROJECT EVALUATION:  METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS
The purpose of this article is to describe the specific forms adopted by
general project evaluation methodology in the case of social programs.  Particularly,
the definition of the “without project situation” and the mechanisms to identify
the benefits that can be attributed to the project and only to the project.
But, which are the main elements of so-called project evaluation
methodology?
In project evaluation terminology, a project may be understood to be a
series of activities to assign resources in order to achieve certain objectives. The
principle of separability establishes the convenience of limiting objectives to only
one, if possible, in order to accurately identify the activities that generate the
profitability in the project.
It is also necessary to identify and value the resources used to obtain the
cost stream. Two principles have been used extensively in determining costs: the
benefits in the best  alternative use of the resources, and the possibility of  truly
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freeing them for other alternatives uses if the project is not carried out (principle
that use of the resource may be avoided if the project is not carried out).
Determination of the project’s benefits implies expressing its objectives in
operative terms so they can be identified, measured, and valued in terms compara-
ble with costs (in monetary units). In this case it is necessary to have a point of
reference to make comparisons. This is the so-called “without project situation”,
which is the baseline against which the benefits are going to be measured. In
general, the “without project situation” implies maintaining the status quo,
projecting its normal evolution in certain cases. The benefits of the project are
measured and valued by what the project adds beyond that state. For example, if
the construction of a new port is evaluated in an area that has other ports, the
“without project state” should include the normal growth of existing ports, so that
the new port’s benefits are only the shorter waiting lines over what they would
have been with the existing ports, considering those modifications.
The “without project situation”  normally coincides with the state in which
the project does not operate. However, in the case of social programs that intend
to apply their activities to people it is not possible to determine their behavior in
the “without project situation”, after they received the effects of the project. This
is what is called the missing data problem. People who have not received the
benefits of the project are not necessarily the same as the ones that participated in
it, and therefore considering them as part of the “without-project state” might be
inappropriate. In summary, if one wants to identify, measure and value the benefits,
it would be necessary to locate at least one “clone” for each one of the participants
and make the comparison between the beneficiary and his “clone”. Or, in broader
terms, a population that can be considered similar to the one that has received the
benefits (control group).
The second point of interest consists of establishing whether the project is
actually responsible for the changes observed in the beneficiaries. To make these
ideas clear, let us suppose that a training project that has given specific training to
a group of people is being evaluated. Suppose we want to measure the impact of
the project by the change in the beneficiaries’ access to jobs compared to their
“clones”.
Is it possible to assure that income differentials between trained people
and their “clones” can be validly attributed to the training program? And, if the
answer is affirmative, can one be sure that the results will be the same if the
program is extended to other people?
These two problems: the identification of “clones” that define the “without
project situation” and the determination of the benefits that can be attributed to
the project, constitute two key points in the analysis of evaluation of social
programs that will be studied below in more detail.
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3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIO
The idea of a counterfactual state has a long tradition in economics, and it
has been used extensively in economic history. It consists of determining what
would have happened if the subject being studied had not been present. An
outstanding example is Fogel’s work on the effect of railroads on the growth of the
American economy. In that case, Fogel asks what would have happened to the
American economy if railroads had not existed. There would have been more
investment in roads and navigable waterways; cities might be closer to navigable
waterways, with a city like Saint Louis being more developed and another city like
Denver being smaller. (Mc Closkey D, 1987).  The counterfactual make possible to
construct the “clones” and to define the relevant statistical estimators.
In the case of social programs, two counterfactual lines have been proposed:
1) The first line is related to experimental analysis where chance is left to determine
the control group and the treatment group, 2) The second line refers to non-
experimental designs, where the following counterfactuals have been considered
(i) The beneficiaries themselves before receiving the program’s activities (ii) the
group of non-beneficiaries and (iii) for each beneficiary, a non-beneficiary that is
considered his clone and is matched up with him. In any case, the control group
defined  by each one of the counterfactuals is expressed as the group of people
that possess an X vector with similar characteristics to the beneficiaries.
Associated with the first two counterfactuals presented above for the case
of the non- experimental design (i and ii), the following estimators are used most
frequently: the before/after estimator, the cross section estimator, and the
differences to differences estimator.
If it is assumed that project outcome can be validly measured by working
income, the before/after estimator compares the beneficiaries’ working income
before the program with their income after the program has been completed. The
cross section estimator compares the program beneficiaries’ income with other
people similar to them who have not received the program. In this case, they are
different people who are evaluated in the same period. Finally, the differences to
differences estimator compares beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries before and after
the program in order to establish the difference between the change in the
beneficiaries’ income before the project and afterwards, with the difference in non-
beneficiaries’ income before and after the project. The objective of using this
procedure is to eliminate the effect of economic trends between the initial state and
the post-project state.
The “before/after” estimator refers to the same people, and therefore it is
not affected by problems of personal heterogeneity. Nevertheless, changes in
income due to changes in the level of economic activity between the time when the
program starts and the end of the program (after the program) may be erroneously
considered as an effect that  is attributed to the program.
The cross section indicator does not have the problem of change in trend,
because the incomes of the beneficiaries and the control group are measured at the
same time. Nevertheless, they are different people, and therefore there may be a
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selection bias; in other words, the people who chose to enter the program are
different from the ones who did not. There was a process of self-selection that may
affect the income level, in addition to those from the project itself. The selection
bias resulting from the fact that people willing to participate in the program have
some characteristics that make them different from non- participant, is one of the
main problems in project evaluation. In this case differences in the outcome varia-
ble, i.e working income, are not only due to  project impact but also to the personal
bias of the beneficiaries.
The differences to differences estimator tries to remedy the selection bias
and the effect of the growing economy through time. On the one hand, it compares
the benefits of the beneficiaries, before and after the project and, on the other
hand, it compares people in the control group also before and after. To the extent
the control group’s income has changed in a different way from the beneficiary
group’s income, the difference in the differences is indicative of the impact of the
project.
Sometimes, it is not possible to construct the difference  to difference
estimator because there is no data on the outcome variable for participants prior to
the program. There  is a technique for dealing with the selection bias in those
cases; it consists of selecting a set of variables X so that the outcome variable “y”
will be independent of the project participation variable P, when controlling by X,
i.e. (y II P/ X) . When those variables have been obtained, it is called  ignorability
of treatment (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983)1 because given X, the selection bias of
project beneficiaries (treatment) do not exist any more i., e. The bias have been
captured by the persons X characteristics.
On  technical grounds, it can be said that it is enough for ignorability a
some weaker assumption namely that E(y/X; P=1) = E(y1/ X) and  E(y/X; P=0) =
E(y0 / X), where P =1 indicates participation in the project, and P = 0 otherwise, and
y1 is the outcome variable for participants after participating in  the project and y0
is the outcome variable for non-participants.
Normally, the counterfactuals are reserved for the three estimators
mentioned above; but there are non-parametric methods like matching that are
procedures to build the clone or clones of each one of the beneficiaries, which
should also be considered, by extension, among the counterfactuals.
The matching techniques consist of  using the set of X variables  to locate
the “clone” of each beneficiary  as the person, or people, who is not a beneficiary
of the project and has the closest structure of X characteristics to the beneficiary
he will be the “clone” of. This procedure is very hard to operate if the X matrix has
more than one variable of characteristics, because of the difficulties in measuring
the Xp characteristics that are closest to the beneficiary’s Xb.  Rubin’s theorem
establishes that if the outcome variable,  which in this case is the participants’
income y, is independent of variable P, which indicates participation in the program
(P=1 if he participates and P=0 otherwise), when it is controlled by person X’s
1 Ignorability holds trivially if P is a deterministic function of X which is called selection
of observables (Heckman and Robb 1985)
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characteristics like age, sex, education, among others, then  there is a function p(X)
so variable “y” is independent of  P conditioned by p(X). In formal terms: if y is
independent of P given X, i.e. (y II P/ X), then there is a function p(X) so y is
independent of P given p(X),  i.e. (y II P/ p(X)) where the function p(X) can be
interpreted as the probability that a person with X characteristics participates in
the program. (Dehejia, Rajeev and Sadek Wahba 1998)
In summary, the procedure consists of the following steps: a definition is
made of people’s X characteristics that may be supposed to make income y
independent from attributions to the program (P=1), after it has been controlled by
them. Then, probability p of participating in the program in view of those X
characteristics is calculated, and the clone, or clones, of each beneficiary with Xb
characteristics is chosen as the person that minimizes the difference of his or her
probability of being accepted in the program p(Xc) and the probability p(Xb) of the
beneficiary, in other words p(Xc) = min {p(Xr) – p(Xb)}, where r refers to any other
person in the control group.
The study of siblings and twings provide another way to construct
“clones”. In these cases,  analysis of panel data  has been used in order to follow
the activities of beneficiaries and control groups over several years. (Griliches
1979), (Ashenfelter and Krueger , 1994), (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998).
4. THE DETERMINATION OF THE TRUE BENEFITS OF THE PROGRAM
A second problem that program evaluation poses refers to the method
followed in order to make sure that the benefits are due to the project. This is a
matter of determining that the program is the “cause” of the increase in working
income that has been observed among its beneficiaries, compared to the participants
in the control group.
The Dictionary of the Royal Academy defines causality as a “law under
which effects are produced” and the Salvat encyclopedia adds “and also relationship
between cause and effect.” In this perspective, the causality relationship arises
from a theory, and what empirical analysis does is establish procedures to recover
the value of parameters with the information that is available. For example, geometry
teaches us that the perimeter of a rectangle is equal to twice one side (l1) plus twice
the other side (l2). In other words: P = 2 l1 + 2 l2.  The problem arises because the
available information  may be  incomplete. For example, no information may
be  available on  the length of the second side. In this case the estimable model will
be y = a l1 + u. The purpose of empirical analysis consists of designing estimation
mechanisms that make it possible, with the available information, to recover the
parameters’ values; in this case,  a  = 2.
These procedures become more relevant because often theory does not
provide precise information about the parameters’ value, which is added to the
problem posed for unobservable variables. For example, the theory of demand
establishes a direct and inverse relationship (when one variable increases, the
other decreases) between the quantity demanded and the sale price, but it does
Art.A.Torche.pm6 2/12/03, 10:34 593594 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA (Vol. 40, Nº 121, diciembre 2003)
not delve into further indications about the value of that slope parameter. It is very
important to have estimation methods that make it possible to recover the true but
unknown value of the parameters.
In regard to the determination of a program’s impact, the causality problem
can be expressed in a double perspective. On the one hand, by  determination of an
equation that reflects the theoretical relationship that links the program to the
objective variable that is to be modified. To clarify, suppose that a social program
aims to improve the nutritional state of the pregnant woman and to monitor her
health during pregnancy. Suppose  that a positive relationship has been established
at a theoretical level between the nutritional state of the pregnant woman and the
birth weight of her child. The empirical model can emphasize the specific channels
whereby the program would affect the birth weight (structural model), or a quicker
path can be taken and a relationship can be established between the result variable
(birth weight) and attribution to  the program, in other words, the equation can be
set forth directly: Pn = f(X) + ap P + u (reduced model) where matrix X is indicative
of other variables considered important to determine birth weight, like the mother’s
age, other children born live, etc., which have been selected to make Pn independent
of P when controlling for them, i.e there is ignorability of treatment. In this case, P
is the mute variable of attribution to the program that has only two values: 1 if the
person is a beneficiary of the program, and 0 if he is not. But in a deeper sense it
summarizes the channels through which the effect of the program occurs; for
example, better nutritional state during  pregnancy, control of iron and other
micronutrients, and health checkups, among others, and u is indicative of all the
other unobservable variables that also affect birth weight,  such as hereditary
genetic conditions.
An “adequate” estimate of the unknown parameter ap permits a precise
evaluation of the program. But what do we mean by an “adequate” estimate of the
parameter? There are two properties that have been required of estimators in order
to be “adequate.” They are Unbiasedness and Consistency. Unbiasedness refers
to the fact that if many samples are taken, the average of the estimator’s values that
result from the different samples coincides with the value of the parameter.
Consistency establishes that the estimator’s value approaches the value of the
parameter if the size of the sample approaches the size of the population.
Given the base econometric model, y = f(X) + u, where “u” is an error term,
the classical assumption that the expected value of u given X is null i.e. that
E(u/ X) = 0 play a crucial role. First, it permits to interpret f(X) as the expected value
of y given X. In other words, f( X) = E(y/ X) which relies the econometric model to
the substantive one.  Second, it is not hard to show that E(u/ X) = 0 is also the key
assumption in order to comply with unbiasedness and consistency.  In fact, given
model y = Xb + u,  one method  to estimate the parameter or vector of  b  parameters,
in an unbiased and consistent way, consists of using the information contained in
X and constructing the expression X´y = X´X b + X´u, where X´ indicates the
transposed matrix.  If X´X can be inverted, then: (X´X)-1X´y = b + (X´X)-1X´u and
(X´X)-1X´y can be considered an “adequate” estimator of b if E(X´u) = 0 provide
E(X´X) is finite.
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E(u/ X) = 0 implies that E(xi u) = 0 and every xi variable which does not
satisfy the basic assumption i.e., where E(xi u) „ 0  is called endogenous. The main
causes of endogenousness are: omitted variables, errors of measurement in varia-
bles and reversion of causality, also called simultaneousness. The case of omitted
variables and simultaneousness will be further studied in this article. In fact, the
two most serious difficulties that prevent customary estimation methods like
ordinary least square and maximum likelihood from producing consistent estimators
are the omitted variable and reversion of causality.
The problem of the omitted variable arises when, for example, in a study
that measures the effect of education on income (y = a0 + a1 e + u), there is a non-
observable variable like skill  (H) which affects educational level and income received.
In that case, the relationship between income and education (y = a0 + a1 e + u)
would be spurious, because it would be affected by the skill variable (H). In parti-
cular, the a1 parameter does not indicate the true impact of e on Y. It indicates the
more complex impact of H on y through e and u. The omitted variable generates
problems when it simultaneously affects y (the dependent variable) and e (the
independent variable). When those omitted variables exist, then E(e•u) „ 0. In that
case, it is said that the education variable is related to the error term, in other
words, that it is endogenous.
An interesting case of omitted variables is associated with the problem of
selection bias that has been mentioned previously. This problem can be presented
for example, when there are two alternatives to reach a certain objective, and one of
them is to be used as the control group for the other. This situation arises in the
evaluation of subsidized private schools, when municipal schools are used as the
control group. If an outcome variable is chosen, such as the Simce test2 for example
and the difference in that test among students of subsidized private schools and
municipal schools is considered  a measurement of the incremental impact of the
“subsidized private school” program, an error is made, because the students are
not distributed randomly between the two kinds of establishments. There is a self-
selection bias, which is the case in several non-experimental project designs . It is
necessary to model the selection mechanism that leads certain students to prefer
the subsidized private school and others to prefer the municipal school. The
modeling of this selection process makes it possible to define a new variable that
has the characteristics of an omitted variable, which must be added to the other
ones in the model in order to complete it (Heckman, J., H. Ichimura and P. Todd,
1997).
In the description of a model that sets forth the impact of subsidized private
schools, one may consider that the expected performance depends on the
characteristics of the students and the characteristics of the schools. Nevertheless,
the characteristics of subsidized private schools compared to the characteristics
of municipal schools constitute the differences between the “treatment” group
2 SIMCE is a national wide test taken every year in Chile in order to assess learning
achievement in primary and secondary school.
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and the control group, and it is not necessary to break them down further. It is not
necessary either to further break down the characteristics of students if they are
distributed randomly in the different establishments, because then they are balanced
through the population and systematic biases are not generated.
If the assignment of students is not random, then certain students with
specific characteristics will go to subsidized private schools and others with
different skills will go to municipal schools. The systematic effect attributable to
students must be eliminated in order to have the pure effect of the project. In that
case it is necessary to model the selection procedure in terms of the particular
characteristics of the students that went to one of the groups of establishments or
the other.
There are at least three procedures for eliminating the problem of the omitted
variable:
i) Look for information about the unobservable variables that could be related
simultaneously to the dependent variable and  to some of the independent
variables.
 ii) Replace the endogenous variable x with another one that is related to x but
not to the unobservable variable (H in this case). This is the choice of an
instrumental variable that only affects the dependent variable “y” through
variable X
iii) Model the correlation between variable u that is the error term in the initial
model and  the level of education (e). These are the sample selection models
that explicitly incorporate the effect of E(u e) when it is not equal to zero,
i.e when e is an endogenous variable
The other broad problem is causality reversion that arises from a joint
determination of the dependent and independent variables of a model. In fact,
suppose a model is used where the health status, ES, would be a function of the
use of the health insurance (ES = a0 +a1SS + uss) chosen, among other variables.
However, the choice of the kind of health insurance also depends on the health
status (SS = b0 + b1ES + v). In that case, E(SS u) „ 0, which expresses that the SS
variable is endogenous. It is interesting to note that although the problem of
causality reversion is very different from the problem of omitted variables, both are
expressed  as a situation of endogenousness of some dependent variable. (Dowd
and Town 2002).
When causality reversion exists, the only mechanism for solving the problem
consists of  manipulating the SS variable by identifying an instrumental variable
that is related to SS, but not to the variable u.
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5. AVERAGE MEASURES  OF OUTCOME C OMMONLY U SED  IN MICRO-
ECONOMETRICS
Econometric work on social projects has dealt with three average measures
of outcome. The average treatment effect (ATE), which is the expected effect of the
program over and above the non-treated, measured in a  person drawn randomly
from  the population i.e. E(y1 – y0 )  (Wooldridge, 2002). The ATE is a special case
of the average partial effect for the binary P variable: beneficiaries of the program
and others. The second measure is the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT), which is the average effect of the program on those who actually participate
in it. It is the impact of the treatment over and above the treated if they had not
participated. Finally, the local average treatment effect (LATE) introduced by Inbens
and Angrist in 1994, measures the impact of the program on  people that satisfy
some condition expressed through an instrumental variable or a set of instrumen-
tal variables. Assume that  attendance to subsidized schools is being studied, and
a variable that measures whether or not the mother is a  high school graduate is
chosen. (Angrist, Joshua 1998)  LATE measures the average effect of the program
(attendance at  subsidized school) for those students in the program whose mothers
are  high school graduates.  These statistics are interesting in  themselves, but also
because of their relationship to the traditional measures of benefit employed in net
present values, which is the main measure of project evaluation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This article presents two basic elements for the evaluation of the impact of
a project: the without project situation and the methodology for determining the
benefits attributable to the project. It has been shown in several articles that those
principles acquire a particular connotation in the case of social programs, because
the without project situation  acquires the form of a control group and the people
participating in the program cannot be part of that control group, which makes it
necessary to design procedures to find people similar to the beneficiaries: i.e, their
clones. On the other hand, the choice of those clones creates limitations on the
definition of the methodology used to determine the benefits of the program.
Problems of the omitted variable and causality reversion arise, which are some of
the most frequent reasons why “adequate” estimators of project impact are not
obtained. The article ends with a brief description of procedures to eliminate those
problems.
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